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tesam vupasamo sukho. Impermanent are compounded things,  prone to rise and fall. Having risen, they’re destroyed,  their passing truest bliss. In memory of jcsuperstar, former DhammaWheel moderator.  Cultural studies’ commitment to ethical evaluation and radical political  inquiry has seen it cross disciplinary boundaries and take its investigations from such places as the  dancehall  to  the  bedroom  to  explore,  for  instance,  everyday  practices,  power, subjectivity and the body. But by and large it has neglected questions about religion and  faith.  In  his  essay  of  1998,  ‘Is  Elvis  a  God?’,  John  Frow  suggests  that  perhaps 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because of an unreflexive commitment to the (flawed) secularisation thesis cultural studies  has  failed  to  adequately  theorise  faith  and  religion, which  is  arguably  ‘the most  important  set  of  popular  cultural  systems  in  the  contemporary  world’.1 Extrapolating  from  the  Australian  context  where  an  increasing  awareness  of  and desire  to  honour  Aboriginal  heritage  and  spirituality  has  brought  into  focus  an inescapable  tension  between  a  religious  cosmology  and  the  Enlightenment  ethos governing academic work, he argues  that  this  is a  tension  that  ‘we cannot pretend not  to be subject  to’. He also posits  that  it  is  ‘crucial  to  the  future of  the discipline’ that  it  reflects  on  this  tension  and  ‘enter  sympathetically  into  forms  of understanding  which  are  quite  alien  to  it’,  and  moreover  ‘to  do  so  without condescending  to  those  other  knowledges’.2  Here,  I  pursue  Frow’s  suggestions through  analysis  of  a  discussion  thread  in  an  online  Buddhist  forum  where  the participants debate the issue of faith vis­a­vis knowledge.  This article builds on studies that have attempted to address the neglect of religion in cultural studies. For example, a 2001 issue of the journal Continuum titled ‘Serenity  Now!’,  explored  the  discourses  of  self‐help  and  spirituality  in  various textual  and  consumer  practices.3  Other  scholars,  like  Matt  Hills,  write  about  the neoreligiosity of cult media fans, expose the moral dualisms between academic‐fans and fan‐academics, and question the boundaries of cultural expertise.4 Jay Johnston and  Ruth  Barcan  adopt  Eve  Sedgwick’s  ideas  to  argue  for  ‘reparative’  rather  than ‘paranoid’  readings  of  alternative  therapies  and  related  practices  of  spirituality.5 Johnston and Barcan attend  to  alternative health practices not  just  as  an object of study but also as a source of cultural theory,6 arguing that they ‘have the potential to enrich  and  invigorate—even  to  radicalise—cultural  studies’  own  theorisations  of corporeality, affect and intersubjectivity’. Their aim is to mount a ‘tactical challenge to  the notion of cultural expertise  ...  a  tactical  collapsing of authority,  important at this  particular  juncture  because  of  the  silence within  cultural  studies  surrounding alternative  therapies,  even  while  many  of  us  make  use  of  these  practices  in  our private lives’.7 These  attempts  at  addressing  religion  and/or  spirituality  have  largely focused on media texts and consumer practices. This article will extend the scope of inquiry to examine a set of discourses directly related to a mainstream institutional religion.  Adopting  the  approaches  of  these  studies,  I  examine  the  discourses  of 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Western Buddhism on DhammaWheel (www.dhammawheel.com), an online  forum about  Theravada Buddhism.8  To  engage with  the  normative  truths  of  Buddhism,  I will  position  the  discussions  on  DhammaWheel  as  ‘vernacular  theory’.9  That  is,  I recognise that  theorising  isn’t an exclusive activity of professional  intellectuals but an analytical strategy practised by both academics and non‐academics. This idea of vernacular  theory  has  been  used  in  studies  on  fan  cultures  to  reflect  on  the relationship  between  academics  and  their  objects  of  study;  they  recognise  the intellectual  work  performed  by  media  fans  and  treat  them  as  co‐participants  in working through critical issues.10 As will be seen, members of DhammaWheel discuss Buddhism  in a  ‘shared interpretive  context,  one  that  facilitates  the  emergence  of  jointly  produced meanings’.11  Some  of  them  could  very well  be  professional  intellectuals,  and  from my  observations  it  is  likely  that  many  have  participated  in  tertiary  education. Nevertheless,  the  ideas  they  produce  can  be  positioned  as  vernacular  theory because  regardless  of  their  educational  or  professional  backgrounds  the members do  not  represent  themselves  as  scholars  or  academics—a  cursory  survey  of  the forum  reveals  that, with  the  exception  of  a  few  ordained Buddhists,  the members self‐consciously represent themselves as laypeople engaging with Buddhism outside institutional  settings.  The  concept  of  vernacular  theory  provides  a  framework through  which  I  could  remain  mindful  of  the  tension  between  sympathetic engagement and sceptical enquiry which governs my work, allowing me to engage with DhammaWheel not merely as an object of study but also as a potential source of cultural theory; that is, I examine the discussions on DhammaWheel not to unveil how they are ‘ideological’ but to explicate the normative truths of Buddhism so as to explore potential areas of dialogue with cultural studies on the topic of faith. This is not an unreflexive ‘celebration’ of Buddhist ideas—the discussions are subjected to poststructural analysis and read against their constitutive contexts. The following discussion pivots around the thread ‘Why is Buddhist faith not blind?’;  selected  posts  from  other  threads  that  illustrate  the  themes  raised  in  this thread will be highlighted. I begin by contextualising this discussion about Buddhist faith  within  a  wider  historical  continuum.  This  will  highlight  how  Buddhism  has been  reconfigured  within  the modern  episteme  as  a  set  of  discourse  that  is  both compatible  with  and  critical  of  the  dominant  cultural  forces  of  the  West.  I  then 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examine the responses in the thread more closely to explicate how the Buddhists on DhammaWheel continue to rearticulate Buddhism and produce vernacular theories of  faith.  Revealing  as  it  does  the  discursive  strategies  available  to  contemporary Buddhists  negotiating  the  tensions  between  Buddhism  and  wider  cultural formations,  the analysis demonstrates how an engagement with a religious system like Buddhism opens up  lines of  inquiry  that are of  interest  to  the cultural  studies project. The final section speculates on some of these ideas.  
—DEBATING FAITH In the thread ‘Why is Buddhist faith not blind?’ mikenz66 begins by quoting another member, jcsuperstar: its not  just the 8fp [Eightfold Path] but also the 4 truths [The Four Noble Truths] that require faith, i mean sure there is suffering, that we can all see but why is there suffering? its quite obvious that many have looked at this problem  of  suffering  and  come  up with  different  reasons  so why  should one  [automatically] assume  the buddha was  right? we have  to have  faith that he was right about the cause of suffering, then we again have to have faith that it can in fact end, that he [wasn’t] just unloading a bunch of BS on us and then at that stage we have to have faith that his path will work and that he [wasn’t] just faking it ... buddhism actually takes a lot of faith if you really  think about  it.  it  just  [doesn’t]  ask us  to have blind  faith  like other religions do.12 While  mikenz66  doesn’t  completely  disagree  with  jcsuperstar’s  contention,  he concedes that he would have difficulty  justifying why Buddhist  faith  isn’t blind. He writes: I  mean,  basically  I  have  accepted  the  proposition:  ‘Develop  sila  [ethical conduct], read dhamma [teachings of the Buddha], meditate, etc, and you’ll eventually be liberated [from the cycle of rebirth]’. And I can certainly see progress,  but  there  is  no  logical  way  of  proving  that  that  it  will  lead  to liberation.13  He then compares his situation with that of a Christian who might similarly accept propositions  such as,  ‘Live morally,  go  to  church  read  the bible, meditate,  etc,  and you’ll  go  to heaven’. Mikenz66 notes  that Christians have a different  soteriological 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agenda,  aiming  to  go  to  heaven  after  death  instead  of  attaining  enlightenment  to transcend  the cycle or  rebirth. But  should  they accept and  follow  the propositions put  forth by  their  religion  they  could nevertheless develop  such  virtues  as  loving‐kindness  which  Buddhism  also  espouses,  and  likewise  experience  the  benefits  of their spiritual practice in the present. Heaven would, however, remain unproven to them just as enlightenment or nibbāna (Sanskrit: nirvāna) would remain unproven to Buddhists who are yet to be fully liberated. Mikenz66 then poses the question, ‘So, for the sake of argument, how would you argue that my ‘faith’ is less ‘blind’ than the faith of my Christian counterpart?’ Jcsuperstar replies that it is because Buddhists are ‘asked to test it, and told it  can  happen  in  our  lives,  not  just  after  death.  [A]lso many  other  faiths  have  no tolerance  for  questioning  the  faith  or  the  teaching  themselves.’14  For  jcsuperstar (whose moniker now becomes all  the more  ironic),  it  is  the  injunction to  ‘test’ and ‘question’  in Buddhism that sets  it apart  from Christian  faith. This  is echoed  in  the next  post  by  Jechbi who writes,  ‘It’s  a  different  theory  of  faith  ...  Christian  faith  is blind  insofar  as  it  is  inspired  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  not  based  on  one’s  own  logic  or intelligence or  any other  such ability  ...  If  you  try  to apply  the  term  ‘blind  faith’  to Buddhism,  it  doesn’t  fit  in  the  same way  that  it  fits  into many  forms  of  Christian theology,  because  there’s  an  altogether  different  theory  and  use  of  faith  in Buddhism.’15 It can be seen  in  jcsuperstar’s and Jechbi’s replies  that Buddhism is, on the one  hand,  positioned  in  opposition  to  Christianity,  and  on  the  other,  aligned with logic and rationality. Their rhetoric reflects a wider historical trend beginning in the nineteenth century which David McMahan calls  ‘Buddhist modernism’.16 The word modernism  is not used  in  a narrow aesthetic  sense here,  but  rather  to  refer  to  an ongoing process of rearticulation whereby Buddhism is made contemporaneous to its  historical‐cultural  environment.  Building  on  Charles  Taylor’s  account  of modernity,  McMahan  argues  that  Buddhism  modernism  developed  within  the framework of  three key  ‘discourses of modernity’: Western monotheism,  scientific rationalism,  and  Romantic  expressivism  (and  their  respective  successors).  In  its encounter with modernity, Buddhism has had to negotiate these discourses as well as  the  tensions between them. To better contextualise  the discussion thread about faith  (and  DhammaWheel  more  generally),  I  highlight  the  key  figures  and 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developments  in  Buddhist  modernism,  focusing  particularly  on  those  which  have positioned Buddhism between scientific rationalism and Western monotheism. 
—BUDDHIST MODERNISM The  early  developments  of  Buddhist  modernism  can  be  traced  to  the  Orientalist discourses on Buddhism of  the nineteenth  century. Reflecting  the  colonial  cultural politics  of  the  time,  Buddhism  was  ‘discovered’  by  Europe  through  its  texts.  As Edward Said has argued, ‘The Orient studied was a textual universe by and large; the impact of the Orient was made through books and manuscripts’.17 By the middle of the nineteenth  century,  ‘the  textual  analysis  of Buddhism was perceived  to  be  the major  scholarly  task.  Through  the  West’s  progressive  possession  of  the  texts  of Buddhism, it becomes, so to say, materially owned by the West; and by virtue of this ownership,  ideologically  controlled  by  it.’18  As  the  religion  became  an  object  of knowledge  in  the West  a  textualised  Buddhism  emerged,  one  that  prioritised  the Pali  Canon  (the  earliest  extant  Buddhist  texts  used  in  the  Theravada  tradition) because  it  was  seen  to  embody  ‘the  essence  of  Buddhism’.19  This  textualised Buddhism was also described as ‘original Buddhism’, ‘primitive Buddhism’, and even ‘pure  Buddhism’.  Accordingly,  the  figure  of  the  Buddha  was  historicised  as  ‘the greatest philosopher of India’s Aryan past’ and his teachings interpreted as a system based on ‘reason and restraint, opposed to ritual, superstition, and sacerdotalism.’20 As  an  ‘austere  system  of  ethics  and  philosophy’,  the  Orientalist  interpretation  of Buddhism  was  ‘regarded  as  the  authentic  form  ...  against  which  the  various Buddhisms of nineteenth century Asia could be measured, and generally found to be both derivative and adulterated’.21 Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century Western criticisms of Asian  Buddhism  abound,  often  articulated  by  Christian missionaries who  invoked ‘original Buddhism’ as an ‘ideological justification for the missionary enterprises of a progressive, thriving Christianity against a Buddhism now debilitated’.22 Hence, we find Jonathan Titcomb, Bishop of Rangoon from 1877 to 1882, saying that ‘the true glory of Buddhism has departed.  It  is  now a  crude mass  of  semi‐idolatry  and  silly superstition;  encrusted  by  dead  formalism,  and  sunk  in  apathetic  ignorance.’  This was echoed in 1890 by Reverend Archibald Scott, who asserted that Buddhism had been undergoing a long process of decline ‘without having manifested any power as 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yet  to  recover  and  to  reform  itself  according  to  its  original  and  essential principles’’23  For  these  figures,  Buddhism—or  more  precisely,  an  Orientalist interpretation of Buddhism—was an ally for Christian missionisation. At the same time, those in the West coming to grips with the ‘Victorian crisis of faith’ saw Buddhism as an alternative to Christian morality. This can be observed in  T.W.  Rhys  Davids,  whose  pioneering  work  on  early  Buddhism  was  highly influential in recasting the religion as a largely ethical and philosophical system free from religiosity and ritual. Rhys Davids’ interpretation of Buddhism was shaped by the rationalistic and progressive spirit of  the age and was associated with colonial cultural politics. However, it also reflects a desire in European culture of the time to find alternatives to Christianity morality. As Richard Gombrich notes, ‘Rhys Davids ... naturally  stressed  the  rationalist  elements  in  Buddhism,  because  they  formed  the most  striking  contrast  to  Christianity.’24  Hence,  we  find  Rhys  Davids  declaring, ‘Agnostic atheism was the characteristic of the [Buddha’s] system of philosophy’.25 The use of Buddhism  to  critique Christianity  is  also  evident  in Henry Steel Olcott, co‐founder of the Theosophical movement. In his Buddhist Catechism, he links the  theory of  evolution with  the Buddhist doctrine of kamma  (Sanskrit: karma)  to argue  against  ‘creation  out  of  nothing’.26  Although  Olcott  evoked  mainstream science, it must be said that his theosophical approach to science was on the whole an idiosyncratic one: an ‘occult science’ that ‘brought together the Romantic images of the mysterious East with the current vogue in spiritualism, tempered by scientific and  quasi‐scientific  concepts.’27  Paul  Carus  was  another  figure  who  attempted  to interpret  Buddhism  through  science.  Carus  was  disenchanted  with  orthodox Christianity  but  believed  it  could  be  ‘purified’  by  science,  which  he  described  as ‘divine’  and  as  ‘a  revelation  of  God’.28  In  his  most  influential  work,  The  Gospel  of 
Buddhism,  Carus  drew  Buddhism  and  Christianity  together  in  comparison,  setting them  within  the  framework  of  Enlightenment  rationalism  and  late‐nineteenth‐century science to ‘distinguish in both religions the essential from the accidental, the eternal  from  the  transient,  the  truth  from  allegory’.29  Ultimately,  for  Carus, Buddhism ‘is a religion which recognizes no other revelation except the truth which can be proved by science’.30 It  is  important  to note  that Buddhist modernism  is  a  ‘cocreation of Asians, Europeans,  and  Americans’  and  not  just  a Western  construct.31  As  Buddhism was 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being  rearticulated  in  the West,  a  process  of  reformation  also  occurred  from  the nineteenth  to  early  twentieth  centuries  in  Theravada  Buddhist  lands  like  Burma, Thailand  and  Ceylon.  The  reformation  of  Buddhism  in  these  countries ‘deemphasised ritual, image worship, and “folk” beliefs and practices and was linked to  social  reform  and  nationalist  movements’.32  The  situation  in  Ceylon—where Sinhalese Buddhists appropriated Western discourses about ‘original Buddhism’ as well  as  features  of  Protestantism  to  revive  Buddhism,  restore  national  pride  and resist  colonial  hegemony—is  especially  interesting.  Buddhist  scholars  have described  this movement  as  ‘Protestant  Buddhism’  because  it was  ‘both  a  protest against  the  Protestant missionaries  (and  the  colonial  power  behind  them)  and  in many  ways  a  mirror  image  of  their  attitude  and  activities’.33  To  this  extent, Protestant Buddhism exemplifies Homi Bhabha’s concept of hybridity, which refers to the ways in which colonised people mimic and rework the cultural and discursive forms of the colonisers to subvert colonial hegemony.34 But the influence of the West on the reinterpretation of Buddhism in Asian countries should not be overstated. As Charles  Hallisey  notes,  similar  developments  in  Thailand  were  clearly  ‘not determined by the presence of antagonistic Westerners’ and to this extent provide ‘a useful reminder  that we should avoid attributing  too much  force  to  the “West”  (or Christianity, or Protestant assumptions, or Orientalism) in the changes to Theravada Buddhism  [as well  as other Buddhist  traditions] which occurred  in  the nineteenth century’.35  The  Protestant  Buddhism  movement  in  Ceylon  was  spearheaded  by Anagarika Dharmapala, arguably the most outspoken Asian Buddhist missionary of the  time.  At  the  Parliament  of  the  World’s  Religions  in  Chicago  in  1894,  he proclaimed to the largely Christian audience that Buddhism was ‘Aryan psychology’ and praised the Buddha as ‘a scientist full of compassion for all’, while condemning Abrahamic  religions  for  their  ‘persecuting  spirit’  and  Christian  theology  for  ‘its unscientific doctrines of  creator, hell,  soul,  and atonement’.36 Dharmapala not only interpreted Buddhism with science in order to criticise Christianity, but also claimed that it had anticipated the secular philosophies of the West. Dharmapala also argued that  while  the  West  was  materialistically  advanced,  the  East  was  abundant  in spirituality.  In  doing  so,  he  was  effectively  reinforcing  the  Romanticist  and 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Orientalist  stereotypes  of  the  ‘mystical’  and  ‘exotic’  East,  but  not  without  also turning the discourses of the colonial masters against them. I have highlighted some key moments in which Buddhism was rearticulated in relation to the discourses of scientific rationalism and Western monotheism. This is a trend that continues today, although the dialogues between them have evolved. The  dialogue  between  Buddhism  and  science  has  shifted  from  one  of  broad generalities  to  a  more  concrete  conversation  between  the  two  such  that  we  now find, for instance, researchers mapping brain states and psychological functioning of meditating  monks  with  MRI  machine.  The  dialogue  between  Buddhism  and Christianity has evolved, too, such that we now find thoughtful scholarship like the journal Buddhist Christian Studies.  
—CONTEMPORARY BUDDHISM: DEMYTHOLOGISED AND DETRADITIONALISED On  the whole,  Buddhist modernism  has  demythologised  and  detraditionalised  the religion,  foregrounding  meditation—a  practice  traditionally  restricted  to  select members  of  the  clergy—and  making  it  readily  available  to  laypeople.  This  is exemplified  by  the  Insight Meditation  Society  (IMS)  founded by Americans  Joseph Goldstein,  Jack  Kornfield  and  Sharon  Salzburg,  authors  of  bestselling  books  on Buddhism.  Based  on  an  approach  known  as  vipassanā  (insight)  meditation,  IMS offers meditation classes for laypeople and translates Buddhism into terms that are readily  accessible  to  a  secular  audience,  often  invoking  the  language  of  Western psychology  to  explicate  Buddhist  teachings.  It  should  be  reiterated  that  the demythologisation  of  Buddhism  and  detraditionalisation  of  meditation  is  not  an exclusive  Western  phenomenon.  The  vipassanā  movement  from  which  IMS developed  was  well  established  in  countries  like  Burma  and  Thailand  before  it emerged in the West in the 1970s. The movement focuses almost exclusively on the practice  of  meditation  and  has  deemphasised  ritual  and monasticism.  Developing from  as  early  as  the  late  nineteenth  century,  it  was  a  facet  of  the  revivalism  of Buddhism which, as noted above, occurred not simply as a capitulation to Western perceptions of Buddhism but as part of wider national and social reforms in various Asian Buddhist countries.37 Traces  of  these  characteristics  as  well  as  the  rhetoric  from  the  earlier discursive  moments  in  Buddhist  modernism  are  evident  on  DhammaWheel.  In  a 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sub‐forum  dedicated  to  the  discussion  of  the  practice,  there  is  an  ongoing  thread entitled  ‘The  DhammaWheel  Meditation  Challenge’  which  functions  as  a  kind  of peer‐support group for members seeking to maintain a regular meditation practice. The OP of  the thread writes,  ‘Members may wish to utilise  this  thread by diarising the vicissitudes of daily meditation, by making public a  challenge  they may set  for themselves to maintain their daily practice, and for members to support others.’38 A survey  of  other  threads  reveals  that  many  members  favour  a  demythologised reading  of  Buddhism.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  following  comments  by retrofuturist:  One  of  the  things  that  attracted  me  to  Theravada  as  opposed  to  other Buddhist  traditions was  that  the  associated mythology was  by‐and‐large believable. In many other traditions I saw things that seemed superstitious in nature and  initially  I  felt quite negatively  towards  them  thinking,  ‘The Dhamma  is  so  great,  so  effective,  yet  you  are  turning  people  away  from the rational and straightforward teachings of  the Buddha’.  In  time I came to see that Theravada had its own mythology too, and some of  it (though certainly not  all) was  embedded within  the Pali  Canon  itself.  I  found  it  a little disconcerting but by this stage I had enough faith in the Dhamma that such things no longer had the power to turn me away.39 The  so‐called  ‘mythological’  and  ‘superstitious’  elements  of  Buddhism  are disconcerting for retrofuturist, although interestingly he says that he had developed enough faith in the teachings such that the seeming contradictions no longer bother him  (I will  return  to  examine  this  later).  In  another discussion, Mexicali  dismisses religious and ritualistic expressions outright: I’ve studied Theravada for some time but only recently came over from a Mahayana  practice  (my  final  break  was  literally  a  few  days  ago).  So  I understand  what  you’re  saying.  And  for  some  time  I  was  ending  my evenings  reciting  Amida’s  name  hoping  for  rebirth  in  the  pure  land, modeling  compassion  on  Kuan  Yin  (a  pre‐Buddhist  Chinese  figure  who became conflated with Avolekitsvara) and bowing to beings that I have no evidence for the existence of, and whose continued existence goes against a  number  of  principles  the  Buddha  spoke  plainly  of.  There  is  something seductive about all the ritual and prayers and secrets, but at the end I was 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forced to conclude that they are not really the dharma, at best things we’ve layered on  top of  it over millennia. Asking why Theravada has no  tantric practices is somewhat like asking why Theravada doesn’t include prayers to  Odin  or  Islamic  salat;  they’re  simply  a  different  teaching  with  no perceived benefit.40 Consider also  the  following comments by DarkDream about an article by a Thai  monk‐scholar  who  questions  the  limits  of  a  rationalistic  and  scientific Buddhism and calls for ‘skilful’ uses of sacred expressions such as deities, miracles, amulets and others from the so‐called realm of superstition: So praying to deities for good fortunate [sic], attaching to amulets and so on is a good thing. This to me has absolutely nothing to do with Buddhism. The Buddha  taught a person  to  rely on  themselves and not  look  to gods, rituals and things to make there [sic] life better.41  Against such a definition of Buddhism, it seems that those who engage with ritual practices have to speak as apologists: I know  that many people don’t  like  ritual and  fancy Buddhist‐stuffs  [sic]. But I’ll [tell] you that from my pov, people who struggle with parts of the Buddha’s  dhamma  might  find  spending  time  daily  really  focusing  on venerating the Buddha might be [sic] useful.  I know I might make people mad by saying that, but it’s just my opinion.42 Notions  of  an  ‘authentic’  rationalistic,  non‐religious,  and  even  scientific  Buddhism continue  to  influence  these  exchanges  and  have  indeed  set  the  parameters  for thinking  about  faith. Within  these  parameters,  traditional  expressions  of  faith  are rendered  superfluous  if  not  anathema  to what  the Buddha  ‘originally’  taught. This interpretation  of  Buddhism  appears  to  find  its  strongest  support  in  the  Kalama 
Sutta, a text which has been described as ‘the Buddha’s charter of free inquiry’ and even,  ‘the  Magna  Carta  of  Buddhist  philosophical  thought’.43  Although  hardly mentioned in traditional commentaries, the sutta has from the turn of the twentieth century become central to Buddhism. It recounts the sermon given by the Buddha to the  Kalamas  who,  confronted  with  contradictory  teachings  offered  by  various wandering holy men, ask the Buddha for advice on resolving their uncertainty. This passage is often cited as the pith of the Buddha’s response: 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Come,  Kalamas.  Do  not  go  upon  what  has  been  acquired  by  repeated hearing,  nor  upon  tradition,  nor  upon  rumour,  nor  upon  scripture,  nor upon  surmise,  nor  upon  axiom,  nor  upon  specious  reasoning,  nor  upon bias  toward a notion pondered over, nor upon another’s  seeming ability, nor  upon  the  consideration  ‘The  monk  is  our  teacher.’  When  you yourselves know: ‘These things are bad, blameable, censured by the wise; undertaken and observed, these things lead to harm and ill,’ abandon them ... When you yourselves know:  ‘These  things are good, blameless, praised by  the  wise;  undertaken  and  observed,  these  things  lead  to  benefit  and happiness,’ enter on and abide in them.44 The  Buddha,  it  appears,  is  warning  against  dogmatism  and  blind  faith, encouraging  instead  an  attitude  of  rigorous  free  inquiry  and personal  verification, and indeed even a certain scientific impulse. For those favouring this interpretation, the  passage  demonstrates  that  the  Buddha  was  advocating  a  kind  of  rationalist‐empiricist epistemology to resolve uncertainty and doubt, a method that  leaves no place for tradition and faith—or if it does, admits faith only after it has been ‘tested’ and  ‘verified’  and rendered  ‘non‐blind’. To  return  to  the discussion  thread  ‘Why  is Buddhist  faith  not  blind?’,  it  is  likely  that  this  view  of  Buddhism  as  a  rationalist‐empiricist  system  informs  jcsuperstar’s  and  Jechbi’s  position  that  faith  must  be ‘based on knowledge’. But mikenz66 doesn’t find this position adequate. He writes: ‘But fully testing it means going all the way to Arahantship [an arahant  is one who has attained nibbāna], which may take me quite a few more lifetimes at this rate.’ He then cites a sutta that illustrates this fact before saying, ‘So, until then we are taking it on trust, aren’t we?’ Mikenz66 is also unconvinced by the argument that nibbāna can be experienced in this life (as opposed to the heaven which is experienced post‐mortem); such an argument, he counters, merely asserts ‘a difference in timing, not a difference in “knowability”’.45 
—A VERNACULAR THEORY OF FAITH In  saying  that  there  is  no  difference  between  the  ‘knowability’  of  nibbāna  and heaven, mikenz66 appears to be probing the limits of rational thought. He is, I argue, articulating  a  vernacular  theory  of  faith  that  questions  the  relationship  between knowledge  and  faith,  and  challenges  the  rational‐empirical  reading  of  Buddhism 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which reduces faith to a problem of epistemology—that is, of ‘knowability’. In doing so,  mikenz66  is  rethinking  the  terms  of  the  relationship  between  Buddhism  and scientific rationalism which has strongly influenced how the religion is understood.  According  to  Thomas  McLaughlin,  vernacular  theory  is  articulated  in ‘ordinary language’ and ‘does not differ in kind from academic theory’—accordingly, academic  theory  should  not  be  seen  as  ‘an  elitist  and  totalising  activity,  but  as  a rigorous  and  scholarly  version  of  a  widely  practiced  analytical  strategy’.46 Vernacular theory can be found in, for example, the working knowledge that nurses develop  in  providing healthcare.  Their  ideas  about  healthcare  are  shaped by  their day‐to‐day  experiences  at  the workplace  and may  sometimes  coincide  or  contrast with the theories produced by healthcare academics and institutions. However, the vernacular theories about healthcare would not usually be recognised as legitimate ‘theory’.  Vernacular  theory  can  also be  found  amongst  the discourses produced  in fan  communities.  In  this  sense,  vernacular  theory  is  akin  to  Foucault’s  idea  of ‘subjugated knowledge’, which he characterises as ‘an autonomous, non‐centralised kind of  theoretical production’, a kind of knowledge articulated under  ‘the tyranny of globalising discourses’.47  In this post, we see mikenz66 articulating a vernacular theory of faith: The  point  I  am  trying  to  make  is  that,  despite  the  statement  that  in Buddhist practise [sic] one should ‘test for oneself’, the advertised goal of Arahantship (or even Stream Entry) is,  in fact, unverifiable until achieved [Stream Entry is an important early stage in the path towards nibbana.].   Personally,  I  keep  practising  because  I  can  see  that  it  does  give improvements.  I  can  see  that  my  teachers  are  living  the  holy  life  and  it appears  to  be  working  for  them.  I  can  verify  certain  signposts  from  the Suttas, Commentaries, Dhamma books and talks, and discussions with my teachers.    However,  I  cannot  actually  state  that  I  have  ‘verified  the  teachings’  in the sense of verifying the ultimate goal (Nibbana). And I suspect that there are few, if any, here who can.   Of  course,  it  is  possible  to  ‘redefine’  the  goal  as  something  along  the lines of: ‘Being reasonably happy and content in this life’. Well, if that’s the 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goal, I could say that I’ve verified it too. However, from my reading of the Teachings, it’s not...48 Mikenz66  is  here  offering  a  different  conceptualisation of  faith  from  that  typically read  in  the  Kālāma  Sutta.  In  fact,  his  views  about  faith  intersect  with  three  key arguments  in  Stephen  Evans’s  essay,  ‘Doubting  the  Kalama  Sutta:  Epistemology, Ethics,  and  the  “Sacred”’,  in  which  he  challenges  the  dominant  epistemological reading of the Kālāma Sutta.49  First, Evans  reconsiders  the existing  translation of key  terms  in  the  text  to argue that the ‘uncertainty’ experienced by the Kālāmas was a kind of indecisiveness rather than doubt.50 The question for the Kālāmas, he argues, was not so much ‘What teaching is true?’ but ‘Whose teaching is true?’ This is a different approach to ‘truth’ from that of early Orientalist scholars whose interpretations of Buddhism continue to influence the understanding of Buddhism today. For the Orientalist, truth is not so much a question of ‘who was it that knew something’ but ‘what was it that could be known’.51 But if we were to follow Evans’s arguments, the emphasis then shifts away from ‘what’ to ‘who’. This means that the kind of truth that the Kālāmas were after is not—as  those  favouring  a  narrow  rationalistic‐empiricist  reading  of  Buddhism would  argue—the  truth  of  objective  knowledge.  Noting  the  nuances  of  the  Pali language,  Evans  does  concede  that  the  question  ‘Who  speaks  the  truth?’  could  be used  to  both  enquire  about  truth  statements  and  about  who  is  giving  an  honest account of oneself. But given the cosmological assumptions of the time, he maintains that  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Kālāmas  distinguished  between  these  two  possible meanings:  one  ethical  the  other  epistemological.  This  underscores  the  fact  that  it cannot be unambiguously argued the Kālāmas are seeking epistemic certainty. The question of ‘Who?’ is as much about ethical issues as it is about objective knowledge. Second,  Evans  points  out  that  in  the  criteria  given  by  the  Buddha  for accepting  or  rejecting  a  teaching  (that  is,  ‘when  you  yourself  know:  “These  things are  bad/good  ...  blameable/not  blameable  ...  are  censured/praised  by  the wise...’), the Pali word that is translated as ‘things’ in this instance refers more accurately to ‘fundamental attitudes and actions’ rather than ‘doctrines’ or ‘truth statements’. This means that an epistemological reading of the passage becomes unlikely, for ‘it is not clear what  it would mean  to  blame or  censure  statements. Neither  is  it  clear  how blame or censure would bear on their truth.’52 He further adds that the Buddha does 
Edwin Ng—Cultural Studies and Matters of Faith  261 
not in fact say that one should know whether the fundamental attitudes and actions are true or  false, but whether they are wholesome or unwholesome. Evans argues, ‘We would  seem  rather  to be  in  the  realm of  ethics  than of  epistemology,  and  the 
Sutta  would  seem  to  offer  a  model  of  ethical  reasoning,  a  method  rather  of determining the good than the true.’53  Third,  Evans  notes  that  that while  it  is  believed  that  an  enlightened  being will come to understand such things as kamma and rebirth with certainty, and even transcend them, until one reaches that state there is no empirical way of proving it. The  Buddha  appears  to  admit  this,  if  only  tacitly,  in  the  text  itself.54  This  then suggests that the Buddha did not preclude a gap of uncertainty even as he enjoined the Kālāmas to ‘know for themselves’ the harm and benefits of various attitudes and actions. To this extent, ‘knowing for oneself’ what is good or evil isn’t achieved solely by empirical  ‘testing’ and  ‘verification’ (which can only ever be partial) but also by an  implicit  appeal  to  wise  counsel  and  tradition,  which  in  turn  informs  one’s decision to follow any teachings. Evans concludes: the method given for making a decision leaves a gap of uncertainty, which is to be filled by an act of faith. An act of faith, indeed, is what the Buddha’s discourse  here  elicits  ...  The  phrase  ‘know  for  yourselves’  is  sometimes invoked  to  show  that  Buddhism  does  not  require  faith  [or  to  compare Buddhist faith against other ‘blind faiths’] ... however, the phrase could be translated  as  ‘Should  you  yourselves  come  to  feel  that’,  suggesting  the possibility  that  the  method  is  not  intended  to  be  rigorous,  and  that  it leaves ample room for a gap of uncertainty to be filled by faith.55  Mikenz66  echoes  Evans  in  questioning  the  limits  of  reading  Buddhism through  rationalist‐empiricist  lenses.  He  recognises  that  the  goal  of  nibbāna  is unverifiable until one actually attains some degree of enlightenment which is said to take  lifetimes.  Yet  he  remains  committed  to—indeed,  has  faith  in—Buddhism. His faith  in Buddhism results not so much  from epistemic certainty about nibbāna but from  experiencing  ‘improvements’  in  his  life,  presumably  the  relative  benefits  of relinquishing  the  fundamental  attitudes  and  actions  that  cause  unhappiness.  For mikenz66,  to  follow  the Buddha’s method of  ‘test  for oneself’  is at  least as much a question  of  ethics  as  it  is  of  epistemology.  He  is  willing  to  commit  to  Buddhism despite not having epistemic certainty about the goal of nibbāna. His decision is an 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act of faith that leaves open a gap of uncertainty. To this extent, he fails to see how his  faith  can  be  argued  as  less  ‘blind’  than  those who  choose  to  live  their  lives  as though ‘God’ or ‘heaven’ were true.  Even  those  favouring  a  demythologised,  rationalistic  reading  of  Buddhism acknowledge  the  ethical  bases  of  faith.  For  retrofuturist—whom  as we  have  seen valorises  the  ‘rational  and  straightforward  teachings’  of  the  Buddha  over  the ‘mythological’  and  ‘superstitious’  aspects  of  Buddhism—faith  is  founded  on  the ‘wholesome mind states’ that result from following the teachings. In a conversation, he told me that what strengthened his faith in Buddhism was ‘Reduction in suffering ...  the  practical  application  of  the  Four  Noble  Truths.  Seeing  repeatedly  over  time that yes, this suffering is because of craving.’ Jechbi—for whom faith must be based on logic—expresses similar sentiments, conceding that it is impossible to ‘know for sure’  Buddhism’s  penultimate  truth,  which  until  realised  can  only  remain  an ‘imagined future’. He chooses instead to have faith in ‘suffering’: After  all,  the Buddha’s  entire  teaching  revolves  around  suffering  and  the end  of  suffering  ...  The  reality  is  that  we’re  all  suffering.  We’ve  mostly learned at least to some extent that short‐term solutions like wealth, good‐relationships,  good  health  etc.  yield  only  temporary  results.  Suffering continues.  So  we’re  motivated  to  practice  for  the  end  of  suffering  for ourselves and others  ...  In Buddhism,  I don’t  think we have blind  faith  in some  imagine[d]  future,  such  as  arahantship.  Instead,  we  have  firm, unshakable faith  in suffering, real and present  in this very moment. Faith in suffering motivates us.56  ‘Suffering’ is commonly used as shorthand for the doctrine of dukkha, but it doesn’t adequately capture the nuances of the term, which could also be expressed as ‘unsatisfactoriness’, ‘stress’, ‘anguish’, ‘affliction’, and so forth. It is also sometimes expressed  by way  of metaphor;  for  example,  of  a  carriage with  an  ill‐fitted wheel such that it is impossible to have smooth ride on it. Although the doctrine posits that life is of the nature of dukkha, it is not a pessimistic outlook but an honest evaluation of the fact that there is no immutable state of affairs (wealth, success, happiness, and so  forth)  in an ever‐changing and  thoroughly contingent world—not  least because every biological body eventually dies. Buddhism further posits that it is the tendency to crave  fixity  in  the  face of  inevitable change  that  is  the cause of dukkha. But  it  is 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possible  to  transcend  dukkha  if  one  eradicates  craving.  To  this  end,  Buddhism prescribes a path of ethical conduct, mental training and wisdom, which allows one to  eradicate  craving  and  thereby  attain  release  from  dukkha.  These  four propositions—the nature  of dukkha,  the  cause  of dukkha,  the  cessation  of dukkha, and the path enabling the cessation of dukkha—are known as the Four Noble Truths. Retrofuturist says that he has experienced the ‘wholesome mind states’ and the  ‘reduction  of  suffering’  that  results  from  ‘the  practical  application  of  the  Four Noble Truths’.  To  this  extent,  he  can  claim  to have  ‘tested’—and even  to  a  certain degree ‘verified’—the Four Noble Truths. He cannot claim to have absolute certainty about  the  Four  Noble  Truths,  however,  for  that  would  mean  the  attainment  of nibbana.  Yet,  that  he  has  experienced  a  reduction  of  ‘suffering’  and  developed wholesome mind  states  is  enough  for him  to have  faith  in  the  teachings. His  faith, then, is grounded not on epistemic certainty but on ethics. In following the teachings he  has,  perhaps  like  mikenz66,  experienced  ‘improvements’  in  his  life.  Jechbi appears to have experienced the same when he says that he has faith in ‘suffering’. 
—CULTURAL STUDIES AND MATTERS OF FAITH In  their  attempts  to  follow  Buddhism,  Western  Buddhists  like  mikenz66, retrofuturist,  and  Jechbi  have  had  to  rethink  the  relationships  between  reason, religion,  faith,  knowledge  and  ethics  which,  unlike  the  Western  philosophical tradition,  aren’t  categories  sharply  distinguished  in  Buddhism.  Critical  theory exploring  new  interrelationships  between  these  categories  could  strike  up productive  conversations  with  Buddhism.57  This  analysis  also  highlights  how Buddhism  negotiates  dominant  cultural  formations  and  evolves  against  various contexts of social struggles. These themes are of interest to cultural studies insofar as its aim is to investigate the dynamics between knowledge practices and relations of  power. Here  I  have  focused on Buddhism,  but  it  is  possible  that  other  religious systems  could  refract  the  same  themes.  Yet  cultural  studies  appears  reluctant  to engage  with  religious  knowledge  practices.  Before  concluding,  I  wish  to  briefly reflect  on  this  issue.  I  speculate  on  a  related  question  of why  cultural  studies  has been silent about the pathologising discourses of ‘new atheism’: has cultural studies’ reluctance  to  explore  religion  and  faith  left  it  incapable  of  responding  to  new atheism?58 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New atheism sees  itself as the defender of Enlightenment reason, and from scientific  premises  attacks  religion—and,  more  precisely,  faith—for  its  alleged irrational  belief  in  false  propositions.  Faith  is  not  only  false  but  dangerous  or,  as Dawkins  puts  it,  a  kind  of  ‘virus’  that  induces  destructive  lunacy  and which must therefore be stopped with nothing  less than utmost ridicule and contempt.59 Given the  immense  popularity  of  the  texts  produced  by  Richard  Dawkins  and  other  so‐called new atheists  like Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett, new atheism has arguably become a dominant discourse on faith  in present times. New atheism  makes  important  arguments  against  religious  fanaticism,  but  it  is  also ethically  questionable:  in  describing  faith  as  a  virus  it  effectively  pathologises  all people of faith regardless of religious affiliation. For critics like Dawkins, faith is first and  foremost  a  problem  of  epistemology.  Conceptualised  in  this  manner,  the ‘proper’ human subject is essentialised as resolutely rational. While  there  has  yet  to  be  any  sustained  discussion  of  new  atheism within cultural  studies,  there  are  studies  that  have  questioned  the  idea  of  the  resolutely rational  subject.  Following  the work  of  Barbara  Hernstein  Smith,  Hills  posits  that academia in general  is bounded by its own ‘imagined subjectivity’ of the resolutely rational academic. He suggests that imagined subjectivity ‘attributes valued traits of the subject “duly trained and informed” only to those within the given community, while denigrating or devaluing the “improper” subjectivity of those who are outside the community’.60 Yet, as Hills further argues: The  possibility  that  this  intense  valuing  of  rationality  is  imagined  is evident  from  the  fact  that  different  theoretical  approaches  within  the academy cannot be brought together via rational activity, nor can the truth claims of any one theory be rationally adjudicated on the grounds of pure ‘evidence’, whatever such a thing would look like. In short, academics have no choice, when all is said and done, other than to believe in their favoured theories. But, at the same time, the possibility that faith is the ultimate glue within academic argument is typically disavowed and ignored in favour of the imagined subjectivity of the rational academic.61 Hills, who is arguing against the moral dualisms posited between detached ‘rational’ media academics and hero‐worshipping ‘irrational’ cult media fans, duly points out that  academics  too  have  emotional  investments  in  their  favoured  cult  heroes  and 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cult  theorists  of  the  past,  and  hence,  in  terms  of  their  embodied  and  actual subjectivities,  are  never  fully  aligned  with  the  imagined  subjectivity  of  ‘good’ rationality.  Yet,  despite  consistently  failing  to measure  up  to  this  idealisation,  the imagined subjectivity persists as an extremely powerful cultural device. Hills writes, ‘Imagined  subjectivity  is  hence  not  just  about  systems  of  value;  it  is  also  always about  who  has  power  over  cultural  representations  and  cultural  claims  to legitimacy,  and  who  is  able  to  claim  “good”  and  moral  subjectivity  while pathologising other groups as morally or mentally defective’.62 While Hills  is  primarily  concerned with  how academic  practice  transforms fandom  into  an  absolute  Other,  his  arguments  do  provide  a  useful  framework  for interrogating  new  atheism.  For  it  appears  that  new  atheism  is,  to  a  large  degree, about maintaining the cultural legitimacy of the idealised ‘good’ rational subject. It is this idealised position that allows critics like Dawkins to speak of faith as a virus, of religion as that which  induces destructive  lunacy.  I make these observations about new atheism and imagined subjectivity in order to reflect on cultural studies’ neglect of religion: Does a desire to maintain the imagined subjectivity of the ‘good’, resolute rational  subject also explain,  in part at  least,  cultural  studies’  reluctance  to engage with  religion  and  faith?  Has  cultural  studies  ignored  them  because  they  are ‘improper’ subjects of  inquiry for the  ‘duly trained’ rational academic? Has cultural studies neglected  to  examine  the  subjectivities  of  people  of  faith  because  they  are deemed  to  be  of  little  relevance  to  its  critical  project?  If  so,  it  then  finds  itself  an unlikely ally of Dawkins, who ironically is no sympathiser with cultural studies as he so clearly states in his support of the Alan Sokal affair.63 But  doesn’t  cultural  studies  have  an  ethico‐political  commitment  to constantly question  its  own disciplinarity,  to  always be mindful  of  the  relations of power  that  its  knowledge  practices  produce,  and  to  always  re‐examine  its exclusions?  In The Ethics of Cultural Studies,  Joanna Zylinska draws on the work of Derrida, Levinas and Laclau to argue for cultural studies as ‘a responsible response’, tracing  a  ‘double‐vector  decision’  in  cultural  studies  work  that  simultaneously intervenes in relations of power and interrogates its own tasks. She writes, ‘Cultural studies has a duty not only towards the marginal and the dispossessed—towards its “others”—but  also  towards  itself,  its  own  projects,  responsibilities  and boundaries’.64  This  ‘double  vector  decision’  is  evident  in  Hills’  study  of  media 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fandom and Johnston and Barcan’s study of alternative therapies, for instance. This article has been constructed along the same lines. Through an analysis of how Western Buddhists debate the issue of faith—a subject which  remains  an  ‘other’  of  cultural  studies—I  have  addressed  the  discipline’s exclusion  of  religion,  demonstrating  how  an  engagement  with  religious  discourse can  in  fact  elucidate  themes  that  are  of  interest  to  its  critical  project.  The participants on DhammaWheel articulate a vernacular theory of faith to rethink the relationships  between  reason  and  religion,  knowledge  and  faith,  ethics  and epistemology.  Their  arguments  suggest  that  they  are  probing  the  limits  of rationality,  or  as mikenz66 puts  it,  of  ‘knowability’.  They  are  arguably  exploring  a post‐secular  mode  of  understanding  not  unlike  those  being  explored  in  certain strands of critical theory. Their experience of faith, and possibly the experiences of other  religious  people,  could  illuminate  new  ways  of  interrogating  the  imagined subjectivity  of  the  resolutely  rational  subject  that  governs  both  academia  and popular  cultural  discourses  like  new  atheism.  Cultural  studies  could  explore  this possibility as a means to not only interrogate its own disciplinarity but also to begin to respond to new atheism. In recent years, religion has been charged with renewed significance such that  ‘faith’ has become a conceptual site for various contestations between and within cultures. Cultural studies could take its critical interventions to this site. It could begin by speaking with people of faith, or to paraphrase Frow, by entering  sympathetically  into  those  forms  of  understanding  which,  on  closer inspection,  may  not  be  that  alien  to  it.  Given  the  ‘double  vector  decision’  that governs cultural studies, I argue that it has an ethical responsibility to engage with the excluded ‘other’ of religion and address matters of faith—because faith matters. 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